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Abstract
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [K.J.Arrow, Social Choice and IndividualValues,Wiley, NewYork, NY, 1951] shows that the set of
acyclic tournaments is not closed to non-dictatorial Boolean aggregation. In this paper we extend the notion of aggregation to general
tournaments and we show that for tournaments with four vertices or more any proper symmetric (closed to vertex permutations)
subset cannot be closed to non-dictatorial monotone aggregation and to non-neutral aggregation. We also demonstrate a proper
subset of tournaments that is closed to parity aggregation for an arbitrarily large number of vertices. This proves a conjecture of
Kalai [Social choice without rationality, Reviewed NAJ Economics 3(4)] for the non-neutral and the non-dictatorial and monotone
cases and gives a counter example for the general case.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
An acyclic tournament is a binary relation that deﬁnes a linear order; such relations are thought to represent individual
preferences between alternatives. It is a basic problem in economics to ﬁnd functions that map individual preference
proﬁles to collective preferences satisfying two natural conditions: Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and
Pareto efﬁciency (P). IIA requires that the collective preference on two alternatives depends only on the individual
preference on these alternatives. Representing the individual preferences on two alternatives as Boolean variables, the
collective preference is determined by a Boolean function on these variables. The P condition requires that identical
individual preference on two alternatives imply the same for the collective preference, i.e. the Boolean functions that
determine the aggregation are unanimous f (x, . . . , x) = x.
This notion of aggregation can be generalized to general tournaments.
Deﬁnition 1. LetX denote the set of all tournaments onX.Anm-place generalized aggregation or simply aggregation
is a function f = mX → X satisfying for any R1, . . . , Rm ∈ X and R = f (R1, . . . , Rm):
IIA: aRb depends only on aR1b, . . . , aRmb for all a, b ∈ X.
P: If aRib for i = 1, . . . , m then aRb.
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Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that for all non-dictatorial aggregation functions there exists a proﬁle of acyclic
tournaments that cannot be aggregated into an acyclic tournament.
Deﬁnition 2. A set of tournaments C ⊂ X is closed to an aggregation f iff f (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ C for R1, . . . , Rm ∈ C.
Thus Arrow’s theorem shows that the set of acyclic tournaments is not closed to any aggregation satisfying the IIA
and P conditions. From a combinatorial point of view it is interesting to ask whether a similar result would hold on
other sets of tournaments.
Much research has been done on sets of acyclic tournaments (also called restricted domains) that preserve acyclicity
under aggregation such as Black’s [2] work on single peaked tournaments.1 It can be shown that the set of single peaked
tournaments is closed to aggregation. The problem with the set of single peaked tournaments is the lack of symmetry
between alternatives. For instance, alternatives in the middle2 can never be the least preferred for any tournament in
the set so they have an inherent advantage upon those at the beginning or the end.
The image of tournamentR under a permutation  ofX is a tournamentR such that aRb iff (a)R(b) for a, b ∈ X.
A set of tournaments is symmetric if it is closed to permutations i.e. R ∈ C implies R ∈ C for any permutation .
The group of permutations acts transitively on the set of acyclic tournaments, thus the set of acyclic tournaments is
symmetric but has no proper symmetric subsets, hence no restricted domain is symmetric. The cyclic tournaments on
three alternatives namely {R1, R2} such that aR1b, bR1c, cR1a and aR2c, cR2b, bR2a are an example of a symmetric
set of tournaments.Another example is the set of i-nearly acyclic tournaments 1 i( n2 ), these are tournaments which
disagree with acyclic tournament on no more then i pairs a, b ∈ X.
Are there any symmetric sets of tournaments that are closed under some aggregation? These questions appeared in
the wider framework of choice functions. A choice function on a set of alternatives X is a function specifying for each
subset of X the most preferred alternative, the only requirement being that it belongs to the subset. This is another way
to model preference, through a function that speciﬁes the most preferred alternative from any set. Linear orders are
embedded in this class through maximizing functions, but this class is wider.3 As with tournaments, the notions of
symmetry and aggregation can be generalized to choice functions and it is natural to ask whether there exist symmetric
sets of choice function that are closed to aggregation. It was conjectured by Kalai [4] that the only symmetric set of
choice functions on at least four alternatives closed to non-dictatorial aggregation is the set of all choice functions. A
variant of this deﬁnition is to look at constant size subsets of X (a tournament is a choice function on 2-sets). k-set
choice functions were studied by Shelah [6] who proved the conjecture for 7k |X| − 7. In this paper we explore
Kalai’s conjecture for tournaments, we show that the general conjecture is false but it becomes true with some additional
conditions.
Deﬁnition 3. An aggregation f is neutral if R = f (R1, . . . , Rm) implies R = f (R1 , . . . , Rm) for any R1, . . . , Rm
and permutation .
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If C is a symmetric set of tournaments on at least four alternatives closed to an aggregation function that
is either non-neutral or non-dictatorial and monotone then C is the set of all tournaments.
This results introduces new directions in the study of the Arrow impossibility phenomena in classical social choice
theory and shows that the phenomena is further reaching than indicated by previous results. A natural resolution to
Arrow’s paradox would be to relax the transitivity requirement a little. Had the domain of i-nearly acyclic tournaments
been closed to aggregation, it would have been possible to create an almost ideal voting scheme by tolerating a bounded
amount of irrationality. The main theorem shows, however, that neither this domain nor any other domain obtained by
relaxing the transitivity requirement, is closed to monotone aggregation. Thus, there is no bound on the irrationality
generated through aggregation.
1 A full characterization of acyclicity preserving sets was given by Kalai and Muller [3].
2 The single peakedness is relative to some ﬁxed linear order, middle in this case refers to alternatives that are neither the most or least preferred
relative to the ﬁxed order.
3 For instance a choice function choosing the second best relative to some linear order cannot be a maximizing function.
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In Section 5 we show that the impossibility results do not necessarily apply to non-monotone aggregation functions.
We prove this by constructing a domain of tournaments that is both symmetric and closed to a non-monotone aggregation
function. This shows that Kalai’s conjecture is false in the general case and that monotonicity is an essential part of the
impossibility phenomena. It is left to future research to characterize symmetric domains that are closed to non-monotone
aggregation.
2. Preliminaries
We identify X with a set of |X| vertices and we identify tournament R with an orientation (X,E) of the full graph
K|X| such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ E iff aRb.
An edge {o, a} is out of o if oRa and it is into o if aRo. The out degree of o ∈ X in tournament R is V Rout(o) := |{a ∈
X − {o} : oRa}|. If V Rout(o) = 0 then o is called a sink and if V Rout(o) = n − 1 then o is called a source.
Denote Ro the tournament induced on X − {o} by R. For a set of tournaments C let Cok be the set of tournaments in
C with out degree k at o, thus on,k is the set of all tournaments on n vertices with out degree k at o.
The orientations of choice functionsR1, . . . , Rm ∈ n on the pair 〈a, b〉 are identiﬁedwith aBoolean tuple1, . . . , m
such that
j =
{
0, bRja,
1, aRjb.
Condition I implies that f is characterized by a family of Boolean functions {f〈a,b〉}a,b∈X such that f〈a,b〉(1, . . . , m)=0
iff bRa. It follows that
f〈b,a〉(x1, . . . , xm) = 1 − f〈a,b〉(1 − x1, . . . , 1 − xm).
A Boolean aggregation function is a Boolean function satisfying f (x, . . . , x) = x. Condition P shows that f〈a,b〉 is
a Boolean aggregation function for all a, b ∈ X. By deﬁnition an aggregation f is neutral iff f〈a,b〉 = f〈c,d〉 for all
a, b, c, d ∈ X (including cases where 〈c, d〉 = 〈b, a〉).
Aggregation closure is passed from C to Con−1 (tournaments with o as a source) and Co0 (tournaments with o as a
sink) for all o ∈ X due to the Pareto principle.
Throughout this paper letR,P denote tournaments, o, u, a, b, c, d vertices, x, y Boolean variables and ,  Boolean
values.
3. The non-neutral case
Proposition 1. If C is closed to an m-place non-neutral aggregation then it is closed to a 2-place non-neutral aggre-
gation.
Proof. Let f be a non-neutral aggregation for which C is closed. Non-neutrality is a consequence of f〈a,b〉 =
f〈c,d〉 for some a, b, c, d ∈ X thus f〈a,b〉(x1, . . . , xm) = f〈c,d〉(x1, . . . , xm). It follows that f〈a,b〉(1, . . . , m) =
f〈c,d〉(1, . . . , m) for some tuple 1, . . . , m ∈ {0, 1}. We deﬁne a 2-place aggregation as follows:
g〈a,b〉(x, y) = f〈a,b〉(x1, . . . , xm) for all a, b ∈ X where xj =
{
x, j = 0,
y, j = 1.
By deﬁnition g〈a,b〉(0, 1) = f〈a,b〉(1, . . . , m) = f〈c,d〉(1, . . . , m) = g〈c,d〉(0, 1) hence g〈a,b〉 = g〈c,d〉 and g is
non-neutral. 
Corollary 1. C is closed to a non-neutral aggregation if it is closed to aggregation by an f such that f〈a,b〉 is one of
the functions D1,D2, AND, OR (see Table 1) for all a, b ∈ X.
Proof. It follows from the proposition that if C is closed to a non-neutral aggregation it is closed to an aggregation f
such that f〈a,b〉 is a two place Boolean aggregation function. There are four such functions: D1,D2, AND, OR. 
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Table 1
The two place aggregation functions
x1 x2 D1 D2 AND OR
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Deﬁnition 4. Let f be a 2-place aggregation.A triple (a, o, b) ∈ X3 is increasing in f iff f〈o,a〉(1, 0)=f〈o,b〉(0, 1)=1. f is
increasing if there exists an increasing triple in f.A triple (a, o, b) ∈ X3 is decreasing in f ifff〈o,a〉(1, 0)=f〈o,b〉(0, 1)=0.
f is decreasing if there exists a decreasing triple in f.
By this deﬁnition f is increasing if there exists a triple (a, o, b) ∈ X3 such that f〈o,a〉 and f〈o,b〉 are two different
dictators, two ORs or a dictator and an OR, and decreasing if they are two different dictators two ANDs or a dictator
and an AND.
Lemma 1. For a non-neutral aggregation f there exists o, a, b ∈ X such that f〈o,a〉 = f〈o,b〉.
Proof. Non-neutrality implies f〈a,b〉 = f〈c,d〉 for some a, b, c, d ∈ X. If 〈c, d〉 = 〈b, a〉 then take any o = a, b, if
f〈o,a〉=f〈o,b〉 then eitherf〈a,o〉 = f〈a,b〉 orf〈b,o〉 = f〈b,a〉 otherwisef〈a,b〉=f〈a,o〉=1−f〈o,a〉=1−f〈o,b〉=f〈b,o〉=f〈b,a〉.
If {c, d} and {a, b} have exactly one common vertex then there is nothing to prove. If {c, d} ∩ {a, b} = ∅ then either
f〈a,b〉 = f〈a,d〉 or f〈d,a〉 = f〈d,c〉 otherwise f〈c,d〉 = 1 − f〈d,c〉 = 1 − f〈d,a〉 = f〈a,d〉 = f〈a,b〉. 
Lemma 2. A non-dictatorial two place aggregation on at least four vertices is both increasing and decreasing.
Proof. Corollary 1 shows that {f〈a,b〉: a, b ∈ X} ⊂ {D1,D2,OR,AND}. If f is non-dictatorial then eitherf〈a,b〉=AND
for some pair a, b ∈ X (and then f〈a,b〉 = f〈b,a〉) or two edges with f〈a,b〉 = D1 and f〈c,d〉 = D2. In both cases f is
non-neutral. Lemma 1 shows that there exists o, a, b ∈ X such that f〈o,a〉 = f〈o,b〉. If f〈o,a〉 and f〈o,b〉 are two different
dictators then we are done. If f〈o,a〉 =OR and f〈o,b〉 =f〈a,b〉 =D1 then (a, o, b) is increasing and (o, a, b) is decreasing
because f〈a,o〉 =AND. This proves the lemma in the case f has a triangle with two dictator and one OR/AND edges. If
f〈o,a〉 = f〈o,b〉 = OR and f〈a,b〉 = D1 then (a, o, b) is increasing and (o, a, b) is decreasing. If f〈o,a〉 = f〈o,b〉 = AND
then (a, o, b) is decreasing and (o, a, b) is increasing. If f〈o,a〉 = AND, f〈o,b〉 = OR and f〈a,b〉 = D1 then (o, a, b)
is increasing and (o, b, a) is decreasing. This proves the lemma in the case f has a triangle with one dictator and two
OR/AND edges.
Finally suppose f〈o,a〉 = f〈a,b〉 = f〈b,o〉 = OR, let u = o, a, b (this is where we use the assumption that there are at
least four vertices). If one of the edges from u to {o, a, b} is a dictator then f has a triangle with dictators andAND/ORs
and we are done. Otherwise, f〈u,o〉, f〈u,a〉, f〈u,b〉 ∈ {OR,AND}.W.l.g. we assume f〈u,a〉=f〈u,b〉, if f〈u,a〉=f〈u,b〉=OR
then (a, u, b) is increasing and (u, a, o) decreasing since f〈a,u〉 = f〈a,o〉 =AND, otherwise f〈u,a〉 = f〈u,b〉 =AND and
(a, u, b) is decreasing and (u, a, o) is increasing since f〈a,u〉 = f〈a,b〉 = OR. 
Lemma 3. Let f be a 2-place aggregation and let C be a symmetric set of tournaments. If f is increasing then for all
0<k<n − 1 and o ∈ X:
(1) Cok = ∅ implies Cok+1 = ∅,
(2) Cok = on,k implies Cok+1 = on,k+1.
If f is decreasing then for all 0<k<n − 1 and o ∈ X:
(1) Cok = ∅ implies Cok−1 = ∅,
(2) Cok = on,k implies Cok−1 = on,k−1.
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Proof. Symmetry implies that Cok = ∅ for all o ∈ X iff Cuk = ∅ for at least one u ∈ X and the same follows for
Cok = on,k . Thus w.l.g. we may assume (a, o, b) is increasing for f. The assumption Cok = ∅ for 0<k<n − 1 implies
the existence of a tournament R with at least one edge into o and one edge out of o. Since Cok is closed to permutations
of X − {o} we may assume oRa and bRo. Let R′ be the image of R under permutation of a and b thus aR′o and oR′b.
Let R˜ = f (R,R′) ∈ C, then f〈o,a〉(1, 0)= f〈o,b〉(0, 1)= 1 imply by deﬁnition that oR˜a and oR˜b. oR′s ≡ oRs for any
s ∈ X − {o, a, b} and f〈o,s〉(x, x) = x hence oR˜s ≡ oRs. This shows that V R˜out(o) = V Rout(o) + 1 = k + 1 therefore
Cok+1 = ∅.
Assume Cok = on,k and let R ∈ on,k+1 such that oRa and oRb. Take R1, R2 to be a tournament such that oR1a,
bR1o, aR2o, oR2b and R1 = R2 = R for all other edges thus R1, R2 ∈ on,k = Cok ⊂ C. Let R˜ = f (R1, R2) ∈ C then
once again f〈o,a〉(1, 0) = f〈o,b〉(0, 1) = 1 hence oR˜a and oR˜b. For any other edge R1 = R2 = R thus from unanimity
it follows that R˜ = R. This shows that Cok+1 contains all the tournaments in which a and b are vertices of edges out of
o, symmetry implies that Cok+1 = on,k+1. The same argument mutatis mutandis works when f is decreasing. 
Proposition 2. If C is a non-empty symmetric set of tournaments on at least four vertices closed to a non-neutral
2-place aggregation function f then C= X.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 that f is increasing and decreasing. Any tournament has some vertex o ∈ X which is
neither a sink nor a source, hence Cok′ = ∅ for some 0<k′ <n− 1. Lemma 3 implies that Cok = ∅ for all 0kn− 1
and in particular this shows C contains tournaments with o as a source and as a sink. Having made these observations
we proceed by induction.
The induction base n=4: In this case 4 consists of four symmetry orbits with out degrees (0, 1, 2, 3) (linear order),
(1, 1, 1, 3), (0, 2, 2, 2) and (1, 1, 2, 2). It follows from the deﬁnition of increasing in f that subtracting one from one
entry and adding it to another takes us from one tournament in C to another one in C. This shows that if C contains
a tournament from any one of the orbits it contains a tournament from all the other orbits. Since C is non-empty and
symmetric it follows that C= 4.
The induction step: Since Cuk = ∅ for at least one u ∈ X implies Cok = ∅ for all o ∈ X we may choose a vertex
u ∈ X such that Cuk = ∅ for k ∈ {0, n − 1} and f |X−{u} is non-neutral. The tournaments induced by Cu0 and Cun−1 on
X − {u} are symmetric sets of tournaments on n − 1 vertices closed to the aggregation induced by f. The inductive
assumption maintains that both sets are n−1 hence un,0 = Cu0 ⊂ C and un,n−1 = Cun−1 ⊂ C. Symmetry implies that
the same is true for all o ∈ X.
Lemma 1 shows that there exist o, a, b ∈ X such that f〈o,a〉(x, y) = f〈o,b〉(x, y), thus f〈o,a〉(1, 2) = f〈o,b〉(1, 2)
for some pair 1, 2 ∈ {0, 1}. For an arbitrary P ∈ n−1 take R1, R2 ∈ C such that Roi = P and o is a source of Ri
if i = 1 and a sink of Ri if i = 0. Let R˜ = f (R1, R2) ∈ C and k = V R˜out(o). Since f〈o,a〉(1, 2) = f〈o,b〉(1, 2)
the edges {o, a} and {o, b} are directed differently thus 0<k<n − 1. This shows that Cok contains all the tournaments
with out degree k for which {o, a} and {o, b} are directed differently. Every tournament of out degree 0<k<n − 1 is
a permutation of such a tournaments, since Cok is closed to permutations of X − {o} it follows that Cok = on,k . f is both
increasing and decreasing thus Lemma 3 completes the proof. 
Note that the set of cyclic tournaments on three vertices is closed to the aggregation deﬁned by f〈o,a〉 = f〈a,b〉 =
f〈b,o〉 = OR hence the proposition is not true for less than four vertices.
Corollary 2. IfC is a non-empty symmetric set of tournaments on at least four vertices closed to a non-neutral m-place
aggregation f then C= X.
4. The neutral monotone case
We identify between Boolean functions and neutral aggregations they deﬁne. Let C be a non-empty symmetric set of
tournaments on more than four vertices closed to a neutral aggregation f. For aggregations on two voters the theorem
is trivial since the only possible aggregations are the two dictator functions.
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Table 2
The three place neutral aggregation functions
x1 x2 x3 Maj3 P3 D1 D2 D3 AntiD1 AntiD2 AntiD3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Proposition 3. If C is closed to an m-place non-dictatorial neutral aggregation then it is closed to some 3-place
non-dictatorial neutral aggregation.
Proof. Let r be the minimal integer for which there is an r-placed non-dictatorial aggregation and let f be such an
aggregation. Assume r4 and let [r] = {1, . . . , r}.
Claim 1. There exists j ∈ [r] such that f (x1, . . . , xr ) = xj if x1, . . . , xr has some repetition of variables.
Proof. For two indices l = k ∈ [r] if xk = xl (identical variables) then f (x1, . . . , xr ) = xj is an r − 1 aggregation
function, hence the minimality assumption on r implies that f (x1, . . . , xr ) is dictatorial, thus f (x1, . . . , xr ) = xh(l,k)
for some h(l, k) ∈ [r]. We may assume h(l, k) = k since xk and xl are identical. If f is non-dictatorial then h(l, k)
is not constant on Q = {(l, k): 1 l < kr}. Suppose for some l, k ∈ [r] we have xl = xk and f (x1, . . . , xr ) = xl .
W.l.g. we may assume l = r − 1, k = r and f (x1, . . . , xr ) = x1 thus f (1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = 1 − x hence h(l, k) = 1
for any l = k ∈ {2, . . . , r}. Since h is non-constant on Q it follows that there is some k such that h(1, k) = 1. W.l.g.
we may assume h(1, 2) = 3. This implies that f (1 − x, 1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = x, but on the other hand h(3, 4) = 1
thus f (1 − x, 1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = 1 − x. The contradiction shows that h(l, k) = l for all k, l ∈ [r]. Consequently
h(1, 2) = 1 therefore f (1 − x, 1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = 1 − xbut also h(3, 4) = 3 thus f (1 − x, 1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = x.
The contradiction proves the claim. 
For any a, b ∈ X and R1, . . . , Rr ∈ C let 1, . . . , r ∈ {0, 1} be a tuple corresponding to aR1b, . . . , aRrb. Since
r > 2 there must be some repetition thus w.l.g. 1 = 2. It follows from the claim that f (x1, x1, x3, . . . , xr ) = xj for
variables x1, . . . , xr hence f (1, 2, 3, . . . , r )= f (1, 1, 3, . . . , r )= j . Since this holds for any tuple it follows
that f = Dj , thus f is dictatorial contrary to the assumption.
It follows that C is closed to non-dictatorial neutral aggregation only if it is closed to three voter non-dictatorial
neutral aggregation. There are ﬁve Boolean aggregation functions that deﬁne a non-dictatorial neutral aggregation:
Maj3—majority, Prty3—parity and AntiD1–AntiD3—anti dictator (see Table 2). Monotonicity is preserved under
repetition of variables x1, . . . , xm thus the proposition is true for non-dictatorial neutral and monotone functions. This
implies that C is closed to such an aggregation only if it is closed to Maj3.
Lemma 4. Let C be a symmetric set of tournaments closed to Maj3 and o ∈ X.
(1) If 1<k<n − 1 then Cok = ∅ implies Cok+1 = ∅.
(2) If 0<k<n − 2 then Cok = ∅ implies Cok−1 = ∅.
Proof. Since 1<k<n− 1 any R ∈ Cok has at least two edges out of o and one edge into o thus there exist o, a, b, c ∈
X such that aRo, oRb and oRc. Let R1 be the image of R under permutation of a and b and let R2 be the image
under permutation of a and c thus oR1a, bR1o, oR1c, oR2a, oR2b, cR2o and oRd ≡ oR1d ≡ oR2d for any
d ∈ X−{o, a, b, c}. Take R˜=Maj3(R,R1, R2) ∈ C. SinceMaj3(0, 1, 1)=Maj3(1, 0, 1)=Maj3(1, 1, 0)=1 it follows
by deﬁnition that oR˜a, oR˜b and oR˜c furthermore Maj3(x, x, x) = x for Boolean variable x therefore oR˜d ≡ oRd for
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Fig. 1. Proof of the case n = 4.
d ∈ X − {o, a, b, c}. This shows that R˜ ∈ Cok+1 thus Cok+1 = ∅. A similar argument proves the second part of the
lemma. 
Proposition 4. If C is a non-empty symmetric set of tournaments closed to Maj3 then C= X.
Proof. Any tournament on more than four vertices has out degree 1<k′ <n − 2 on at least one vertex. Since C = ∅
it follows from Lemma 4 that for some 0 ∈ X Cok = ∅ for all 0kn − 1, in particular this shows that C contains
tournaments with o as a source and as a sink. We proceed by induction on the number of vertices.
The induction base n = 4: As we have already mentioned 4 has four symmetry orbits. Each row in Fig. 1 shows
three tournaments in one orbit that are aggregated into a tournament in another orbit yielding the following set of
implications:
(0, 2, 2, 2) ⊂ C ⇒ (0, 1, 2, 3) ⊂ C ⇒ (1, 1, 1, 3) ⊂ C
⇒ (1, 1, 2, 2) ⊂ C ⇒ (0, 2, 2, 2) ⊂ C
hence if C is non-empty then C = 4. The induction step: Let o ∈ X be as above a vertex such that Cok = ∅ for all
0kn − 1. The tournaments induced by Co0 and Con−1 on X − {o} are non-empty symmetric sets of tournaments on
n − 1 vertices closed to the aggregation induced by Maj3. The inductive assumption maintains that both sets are n−1
hence on,0 =Co0 ⊂ C and on,n−1 =Con−1 ⊂ C. For any 0<k<n− 1 and P ∈ ok take R ∈ Cok such that oPa ≡ oRa
for all a ∈ X − {o} and take R1 ∈ Co0 and R2 ∈ Con−1 such that Ro1 = Ro2 = Po. Let R˜ = Maj3(R,R1, R2) ∈ C,
then Maj3(x, 0, 1) = x implies that oR˜a ≡ oRa ≡ oPa for all a ∈ X − {o} and Maj3(y, x, x) = x implies that
aR˜b ≡ aR1b ≡ aPb for all a, b ∈ X − {o} hence P = R˜ ∈ C. Consequently C= n. 
The set of cyclic tournaments on three vertices is closed to permutations and toMaj3 aggregation hence the proposition
is not true for less than four vertices.
Corollary 3. If C is a non-empty symmetric set of tournaments on at least four vertices closed to a neutral non-
dictatorial monotone m-place aggregation f then C= X.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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5. The neutral non-monotone case
In this section we explicitly construct a proper symmetric set of tournaments that is closed to parity aggregation.
This shows that without monotonicity an Arrow type theorem does not hold.
Lemma 5. For n odd let C be the set of all tournaments R ∈ n such that V Rout(o) is odd for every o ∈ X. Then C is a
symmetric set of tournaments that is closed to parity.
Proof. Permutations shift the out degrees between the vertices thus leaving the tournament within the set hence C is
symmetric. Let m be odd, then for o ∈ X, R1, . . . , Rm ∈ C and R = Prty(R1, . . . , Rm). It sufﬁces to show that V Rout(o)
is odd.
Assume X = {o, a1, . . . , an−1} and let j1, . . . , jn−1 be the Boolean values corresponding to oRja1, . . . , oRjan−1
for j = 1, . . . , m. Take i = Parity(1i , . . . , mi )=
∑m
j=1 
j
i Mod 2 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1 then by deﬁnition 1, . . . , n−1
are the values corresponding to oRa1, . . . , oRan−1. It follows from the assumption on C that
∑n−1
i=1 
j
i = 1Mod 2. But
then
n−1∑
i=1
i =
n−1∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ji =
m∑
j=1
n−1∑
i=1
ji = m = 1mod 2
thus V Rout(o) is odd. 
Proposition 5. For n arbitrarily large there exists a proper symmetric subset of n that is closed to non-monotone
aggregation.
Proof. For every n there exists a tournament R ∈ 4n+3 such that V Rout(o) = 2n + 1 for all o ∈ X, hence the set
of all tournaments R ∈ 4n+3 with V Rout(o) odd is non-empty. Lemma 5 shows that there exists a proper subset of
tournaments that is closed to parity on m voters if m is odd, if m is even we take parity on m − 1 voters. 
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